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Using a panel of 30 Japanese chemical and pharmaceutical companies for the period of
1985 to 1998, we estimate the eﬀects of university-industry research collaboration (UIC) on
participating ﬁrms’ research output. We ﬁnd, as in other studies in the ﬁeld, that UIC leads to
more research output, in terms of the number of patents obtained. In contrast to the results for
the U.S., however, we ﬁnd no evidence that UIC signiﬁcantly aﬀects quality adjusted patents,
that is, citation weighted patent counts. By looking ﬁnely at what part of the quality ladder
of patents UIC stimulates, we ﬁnd that UIC increases only those patents with a small number
of citations, thus failing to aﬀect the “average” quality of patents. Discussions of possible
reasons for this ﬁnding are also oﬀered.
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Numerous studies have found evidence of the positive role of university-industry research col-
laboration for promoting research productivity of private ﬁrms. In a series of work, Zucker,
Darby and their collaborators have made a signiﬁcant contribution to the analysis of the role of
prominent scientists for R&D activities of companies in the biotech industry 1. They show that
university-industry research collaboration (henceforth, UIC), more speciﬁcally, the involvement of
“star scientists” in UIC is a key to ﬁrms’ good performance (successful start-up and vigorous in-
novative activities) in the industry. They document this mainly for the U.S. In addition, Zucker
and Darby (2001) ﬁnd similar results for the Japanese biotech industry. Based on a diﬀerent
data set, Odagiri and Kato (1998) also ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects of UIC on Japanese biotech ﬁrm’s
innovations 2 .
Most of these researches have used the number of patents as a measure of the performance of
ﬁrms’ R&D activities. Some have weighted patents by the number of citations. Surely, patents
with many citations are of greater value than others 3 . In this sense, one can think of the
distribution of the “quality” of a ﬁrm’s patents, that is, the number of patents at each number of
citations. This distribution is known to be skewed to the left. A small number of patents attract
many citations, while many are not cited at all. Thus, the “average” quality of a ﬁrm’s patents
can be a poor measure of the quality of the ﬁrm’s research output. As far as we know, none
of the existing studies have looked carefully at how UIC aﬀects the distribution of the quality
of patents. It is, however, of great interest to know what type of innovations in terms of their
quality UIC promotes. In this study we intend to carry out the analysis of this question using
data on Japanese chemical and pharmaceutical companies.
More speciﬁcally, we investigate the eﬀects of UIC on several percentile points of the cu-
mulative distribution function of patent quality, i.e., the number of patent citations. UIC does
not necessarily aﬀect the quality of patents uniformly. The impact may be stronger for research
with higher quality, because cutting-edge scientiﬁc knowledge may be signiﬁcant only for very
innovative R&Ds. On the other hand, UIC may only generate patents of moderate quality, while
1A summary of their research program so far is available in Zucker, Darby, and Armstrong (2002).
2Odagiri and Kato use as an indicator of UIC a dichotomous variable which indicates whether a ﬁrm has had
any collaborative research with university scientists.
3Griliches (1990) thoroughly discusses the eﬀectiveness of patent counts as a measure of R&D.
1patents of high quality are mainly results of ﬁrms’ own R&Ds. The objective of the paper is to
ﬁnd out, by using detailed information on ﬁrms’ R&D activities, which one of these possibilities
is closer to reality in the case of Japanese ﬁrms.
Such an analysis is also interesting in light of recent changes in Japan’s science and technology
policy. Legislative measures have been taken in order to encourage UIC since the late 1990s 4 .
Although our sample does not cover the period after the change in the government’s policy, our
results can be used to infer the eﬀectiveness of such a policy change for raising the performance
of Japanese companies’ R&Ds.
Our sample consists of 30 major chemical and pharmaceutical companies in Japan. We collect
detailed information on their patents and collaborations with universities from various sources.
Our sample period is determined by data availability and is from the mid-1980s to the latter half
of the 1990s. It ends at the time just when science and technology policy in Japan started to
encourage UIC and university patenting.
We ﬁnd that although UIC in the Japanese chemical industry led to increases in the number
of patents, it failed to raise the “quality” of patents. In other words, UIC did not lead to increases
in the number of patents with many citations; it only succeeded in stimulating patents with only
a small number of citations. This result is in sharp contrast with those for the U.S. where authors
have found signiﬁcant eﬀects of UIC on citation weighted patent counts. The result implies that
policies aimed at merely promoting UIC may fail to signiﬁcantly improve the performance of
R&D activities of Japanese ﬁrms. Policy makers need to think more deeply about why UIC does
not lead to major innovations in the industry.
In section 2, we lay out our data and its descriptive properties. Details of data construction
are provided in the data appendix. Estimation methods and results are provided in section 3.
Implications of the results are also discussed in the section. Section 4 oﬀers concluding remarks.
4The reform of Japan’s science and technology policy began with The Science and Technology Basic Plan in
1995. One of the aims of this plan is to strengthen the competitiveness of industries by promoting the industry-
academia-governmental research cooperation nexus. Following this agenda, a series of laws were legislated in order
to encourage the transfer of technology from universities to industries, for example, by encouraging university
scientists to develop their research into patents, which is a useful device of technology transfer. Among others, the
Promotion Law of Technology Transfer from Universities, etc. (TLO Law) was enacted in 1998 and the Law on
Special Measures for Industrial Revitalization (the Japanese version of the Bayh-Dole Act) was enacted in 1999.
22 Data
Measures of Patent Quality
The value or quality of patents varies widely, even among the patents ﬁled by the same ﬁrm
in the same year. There are several attempts to evaluate the quality of individual patents 5.
Among them, we adopt the number of citations received as a measure of patent quality. The U.S.
patent system requires patent applicants to cite existing patents that technologically relate to
their inventions. Trajtenberg (1990) and Harhoﬀ, et al. (1999) show that the number of citations
received has high correlation with other variables that measure the value of the inventions. We
collect the citation data from NBER patent citation data compiled by Hall, Jaﬀe, and Trajtenberg
(2001).
The distribution of citations received of a ﬁrm’s patents is signiﬁcantly skewed to the left,
meaning that many patents are of low-quality and that only a small number of patents receive
many citations. Figure 1 shows the distribution of citations for one representative ﬁrm in our
sample in a particular year. The median (3) is much closer to the minimum value (0) than to
the maximum value (12). The mean (4) exceeds the median. Furthermore, the maximum varies
much with the year of application. For such a skewed distribution, small variations near the
maximum can change the mean signiﬁcantly. Thus, the mean quality of a ﬁrm’s patents can be
a poor measure of the ﬁrm’s research quality.
Though citation received is a usual measure of patent quality, we need to take care of its
measurement problem. The value of one citation may vary with time. More speciﬁcally, available
citation data is truncated at the end of the sample (1998 for the NBER citation data). Thus,
more recent patents tend to receive fewer citations. We deal with this truncation problem in the
simplest way by using a ﬁxed-eﬀects speciﬁcation. Thus, diﬀerences in the value of citations are
absorbed in year and ﬁrm dummies in estimation equations 6 .
Measures of UIC
UIC is measured by the number of articles jointly authored by corporate and university
researchers. The data source is Science Citation Index (SCI) as in the preceding literature such
5See Schamkerman and Pakes (1986) and Lanjouw (1998), for example.
6A more thorough discussion of the measurement problem is provided in Hall, Jaﬀe, and Trajtenberg (2001).
3as Cockburn and Henderson (1998). This database provides detailed information on articles in
scientiﬁc journals. We count the articles whose authors are aﬃliated with universities or colleges
as well as with our sample ﬁrms.
Figure 2 presents the time series pattern of our co-authorship data. The number of co-
authorship starts in the mid-1980s at a very low level, about ﬁve articles per ﬁrm, but then starts
a consistent rising trend and reaches a peak of about ﬁfteen articles per ﬁrm in 1996. This is
followed by a small decline at the end of the sample period. A similar trend is observed for
macro-level data. Based on the data of Japanese ﬁrms from 13 industries, Pechter and Kakinuma
(1999) report that ﬁrm-university co-authorship increased from about 800 in 1981 to about 4800
in 1996, but the growth faltered around the mid-1990s. The rising trend during this period is also
observed in the ratio of co-authored articles to total, which was 41.5% in 1985 and over 60% in
the late 1990s. For Pechter and Kakinuma’s data, the ratio is 23.1% in 1981 and 46.4% in 1996.
Thus, our sample ﬁrms have higher intensity of UICs in their research activity than average.
Table 1 summarizes descriptive statistics of main variables used in the econometric analysis.
Details of the construction of the variables are provided in the data appendix.
3 Estimation Method and Results
3.1 Estimation method
Our main goal is to estimate the impact of UICs on ﬁrms’ research productivity and quality. The
sample consists of 30 major companies in the Japanese chemical industry from the mid-1980s to
the second half of 1990s.
Our basic estimation equation is:
yit = α + β logRit + γ logCit + δi + λt +  it. (1)
i and t are indices for ﬁrm and year, respectively. R is the main input in corporate research
activities, i.e., R&D spending. C is UIC measured by the co-authorship data. This is deﬁned as
the average number of co-authored articles for three years before t in order to consider a possible
4gestation lag between UICs and patents. We also include ﬁrm eﬀect δi and year eﬀect λt.   is
disturbance that satisﬁes traditional assumptions.
We consider three types of dependent variable y. The ﬁrst one is the number of patents
granted in the U.S. for ﬁrm i but applied in year t, which is often used in conventional estimation
of knowledge generating function. Using the U.S. patent data has two advantages over using
Japanese patent data. First, the citation data to measure patent quality is available for the
U.S. data, but Japanese patent data does not include the comparable information. Second, the
Japanese patent system was modiﬁed amid our sample period, making the comparison of the
data before and after the modiﬁcation diﬃcult.
The second dependent variable we consider is the number of patents weighted by individual
patent’s quality, i.e., the number of citations received.
The third one tries to capture ﬁner characteristics of the distribution of the quality of patents.
We consider six variables: 40%, 50% (median), 60%, 70%, 80%, and 90% percentile points of the
cumulative distribution of patent quality, i.e., citations that ﬁrm i’s patents ﬁled in year t received.
The descriptive statistics of these patent quality measures and the mean values are presented in
Table 2 7 . For example, the mean of the 40% percentile point is 1.74, which means that averaging
across ﬁrms, 40% of patents have citations less than 1.74, conforming to the usual pattern that
the distribution of patent quality is skewed to the left.
Note that estimation of (1) by simple OLS may suﬀer from simultaneity biases. For example,
innovative ﬁrms may be able to eﬃciently conduct joint research projects with universities. If
so, the error term, which captures such ability to innovate, correlate with explanatory variables,
hence OLS estimates are biased.
To deal with this problem, we adopt an instrumental variable estimation method. The in-
struments used in this paper are a constant, dummy variables, lagged (endogenous) explanatory
variables, and the following three variables: lagged total corporate articles, the current proportion
of joint patent application to the total, and the number of prefectures where corporate research
7We use the same set of explanatory variables irrespective of the choice of the dependent variable. This can be
interpreted as follows. The quantity of inventions (the simple patent count) is determined by P = f(X), where
X is the vector of explanatory variables in (1), including year and ﬁrm dummies. The patent quality Q is also
determined by Q = g(X). The total value of knowledge created by a ﬁrm, K, is a function of P and Q,s o
K = φ(f(X),g(X)) = ϕ(X). This is exactly the knowledge generation function which Pakes and Griliches (1984)
advocate. f(X), ϕ(X), and g(X) correspond to (1) where y is the number of patents, the quality-weighted sum of
patents, and quality measures, respectively.
5labs locate. The ﬁrst two of the ﬁnal three instruments represent the degree to which the ﬁrm is
oriented toward basic research and cooperative research, respectively. The third tries to capture
the geographical proximity of ﬁrms to universities. Some preceding studies have suggested the
importance of this variable 8, 9 .
3.2 Estimation results
Estimation results of the equation with the simple count of patents as the dependent variable are
presented in Table 3. Table 4 shows estimation results based on citation weighted patents. We
also check the robustness of the results by replacing R&D spendings by R&D stock, and the UIC
variable by its one-year lagged value. We can see that the choice of explanatory variables does
not essentially aﬀect the estimation results. In table 3, UIC has a signiﬁcantly positive impact
on the patent counts as does ﬁrm’s own R&D. However, UIC’s coeﬃcient, although positive, is
insigniﬁcant in Table 4. Thus, citations weighted patents are not inﬂuenced by UIC, while they
are aﬀected by ﬁrms’ own R&D.
Table 5 reports the results for the data up to 1993. This is to deal with problems with citation
data toward the end of the sample. Because ﬁve observations of the dependent variable (total
citations that patents in the year received up to 1998) in 1997 take the value of zero, the variable
is subject to a log0 problem 10 . In addition, the truncation bias problem explained above
seems more serious than it ﬁrst appeared. That is, toward the end of the sample, the number of
citations is not just fewer than in earlier years, but shows only a small amount of variation across
observations. Thus, both high and low quality patents, applied in, say, 1997, receive either 0 or
1 citation by 1998. This means that the data, toward the end of the sample, may not contain
much information regarding the quality of patents. Thus, in Table 4 we drop the data after 1994
to mitigate the eﬀects of these problems on estimation results 11 . As can be seen, even for this
shorter sample, the results do not change essentially. Among others, the coeﬃcient of the UIC
8See, for example, Zucker, Darby, and Brewer (1998).
9We tried several alternative deﬁnitions of the three instruments, such as the number of universities in the
prefectures where corporate research labs locate, instead of the number of the prefectures where corporate research
labs locate. The results mentioned below were essentially unchanged.
10In table 3 this problem was absent because the simple patent count was positive for all observations. In Table
4 the log0 problem was taken care of by adding one to all observations.
11We also dealt with the log0 problem of the sample up to 1997 by adding one only for zero-value observations.
This modiﬁcation results in similar estimates to those shown in Table 4.
6variable remains positive, but is insigniﬁcant 12 .
By comparing the results in Table 3, where y in (1) is simple patent counts, and Table 4 and
5, where y in (1) is the total citations the ﬁrms’ patent received, we ﬁnd that the UICs’ impact
on the “quality” of patents is insigniﬁcant (Note that the diﬀerence between log of patent counts
and log of the total citations is log of the “average” number of citation received). However, as
discussed in preceding sections, the distribution of patent quality is very much skewed to the
left. The mean value (citations received per patent application) gives little information about
the entire distribution. Thus, we examine further the impact of UICs on the quality dimension
of ﬁrms’ R&D activities by using ﬁner parameters of the distribution of patent quality. Table 6
presents the estimation results using six percentile points of the cumulative distribution of patent
quality as y in (1). We limit the sample period up to 1993, because the 40% percentile point and
median are almost the same across ﬁrms after 1994. After 1994, the 40% percentile points are
either 0 or 1 for all ﬁrms. The same is true for the median except for two ﬁrms.
In Table 6, the eﬀects of the UIC variable are in sharp contrast with those of ﬁrms’ own R&D.
The coeﬃcients of UIC are signiﬁcantly positive for lower percentile points (the 40% percentile
point and median) and become smaller in value for higher percentile points. They are insigniﬁcant,
with only one exception, for the 60% percentile point or higher. In contrast, ﬁrms’ own R&D
signiﬁcantly improves the quality of higher percentile points (60% percentile point or higher). In
case (d) where R&D is deﬁned as a stock variable and one-year lagged UIC is used, UIC turns
insigniﬁcant for the 40% percentile point. The broader pattern of results in this case, however, is
similar to the other three cases in Table 6.
Figure 3 presents a result of an attempt to estimate, using the regression results, the eﬀect of
UIC on the distribution of patent quality. It shows two distributions, one, with the level of UIC
at its 1987-93 mean, and the other, UIC at its 1997 mean. The latter is 14.36, while the former is
8.40. Thus, the distribution with UIC at its 1997 mean involves a higher level of UIC. As can be
seen, the higher level of UIC mainly aﬀects patents with 2 or 3 citations. The number of patents
12Zucker, Darby, and Armstrong (2002) use the co-authorship data for the UIC measure and ﬁnd the signiﬁcant
impact of UICs on the quality-adjusted research outputs, i.e., the total of patent citations. Zucker, Darby, and
Armstrong (2002) is diﬀerent from our analysis in the following three points: (1) they focus on “star” scientists
who are prominent in their scientiﬁc ﬁelds; (2) their sample is limited to biotech industry, where UICs is especially
important; and (3) they do not use ﬁrms’ R&D spendings as an explanatory variable. We think that the third
point is a problem. Exclusion of R&D spendings arises omitted variable bias, because it highly correlates with UIC
(the correlation coeﬃcient between the two variables is 0.69 in our sample).
7in this range increases, while the rest of the distribution is largely unaﬀected. Of course, this is in
Table 6 why the 40 and 50% percentile points are aﬀected, but not the higher percentile points.
Thus, UIC in the Japanese chemical industry stimulates research activities of low to moderate
quality, but not those of high quality. As a result, although the number of patents increases with
more UIC, citation weighted patents are unaﬀected because the latter is largely dominated by
patents with many citations. High quality patents seem to be results of ﬁrms’ own R&D activities.
The reform of Japanese science and technology policy since the late 1990s has promoted UIC
in order to improve “industrial competitiveness.” However, our analysis does not ﬁnd a convincing
piece of evidence that UIC results in industrial innovations of high-quality, at least for the data
up to the early 1990s.
4 Conclusion
We have analyzed in detail the role UIC involving major Japanese chemical and pharmaceutical
ﬁrms play in enhancing their innovation productivity. Our main results show that UIC mea-
sured by ﬁrm-university co-authorship has a signiﬁcantly positive impact on the participating
companies’ innovations measured by simple patent counts. This is consistent with the ﬁndings
of preceding literature such as Cockburn and Henderson (1998), and Zucker and Darby (2001)
among others.
However, the role of UIC is limited. Although UIC signiﬁcantly stimulates ﬁrms’ patents
of moderate quality, it does not aﬀect the number of patents with many citations. The latter
is mainly determined by ﬁrms’ own R&D eﬀorts. Thus, UIC has not been found to aﬀect the
citation weighted patent counts.
Japan’s science and technology policy has been under reform since the mid-1990s. One of the
reform’s primary objectives has been to advance “industrial competitiveness.” For this purpose,
several policies have been implemented to encourage UICs. However, our ﬁndings cast doubts
about the eﬀectiveness of such an approach. Policymakers need to investigate more carefully
into the reason for the failure of UIC to stimulate high quality R&Ds. There could be several
explanations for this. First, for whatever reason, Japanese university researches may intrinsically
8be of low commercial value. Second, Japanese private ﬁrms may lack the infrastructure, for
example, researchers with Ph.Ds, to appropriate the potential returns implicit in UIC 13, 14 .
Third, as pointed out by Kneller (1999, 2003), Japanese style UIC may lack the incentive scheme
to stimulate high quality research. For example, until recently Japanese academic researchers
were not allowed to directly share in the commercial returns of UIC they participated.
Such potential reasons for the failure of Japanese UIC to stimulate high quality research
suggest some areas for future study. On the question of intrinsic ability of university researchers
to produce high quality research, results of Zucker and Darby (2001) that emphasize the role
of “star” scientists may be relevant. It may well be that participation of star scientists in UIC
is a key to its successful performance. Second, it might be interesting to examine how results
may change depending on participating ﬁrm’s ability to understand and apply research output.
There is ample evidence that ﬁrms have to build up “absorptive capacity” for exploiting beneﬁts
from external knowledge. 15 Thus, for example, collaboration with universities may contribute
more to ﬁrms’ innovation in the technological ﬁeld where participating ﬁrms have accumulated
research experience. Finally, given the recent change in Japan’s science and technology policy
including incentive schemes for academic researchers participating in UIC, it is important to if
results similar to ours obtain even with the inclusion of more recent data.
13Branstetter and Nakamura (2003) point out that the shortage of in-house Ph.D. level engineers is one reason
for Japanese companies’ weakness in conducting basic research.
14Nihon Keizai Shimbun (2003) argues that Japanese ﬁrms lack this ability and point out a few examples where
promising research results were not regarded as such by management and were sold to U.S. ﬁrms at low prices,
who then developed them into major proﬁt sources.
15Cohen and Levinthal (1989), among others, presents evidence of this. Kamien and Zang (2000) propose a
theoretical model where “absorptive capacity” can inﬂuence the formation of research joint ventures.
9A Data Appendix
Collaboration in article data
The article data source is Science Citation Index (SCI) compiled by ISI, as in preceding
literature including Cockburn and Henderson (1998). We count articles written by corporate
researchers with researchers aﬃliated universities or colleges. The data is conﬁned to “article,”
that is, does not include other types of publications such as “letter” and “meeting-abstract.”
Thus, our data is conﬁned to “solid” results of academic research.
R&D spending and R&D stock
The R&D spending data comes from a survey by Kaisha Shiki H¯ o. In the case of missing
ﬁgures, we ﬁx them up using other data sources such as Nikkei NEEDS and Kagaku Kigy¯ on o
D¯ ok¯ o to Senryaku. The latter is an annual periodical published by Kagaku Gijutsu Tokkyo Ch¯ osa-
kai (Chemical Technology and Patent Survey Group), which collects various information about
research activities of major Japanese chemical and pharmaceutical companies. These nominal
ﬁgures are deﬂated by R&D deﬂator for companies, etc., in 1995 yen.
Construction of the R&D stock follows a conventional perpetual inventory method. Calculat-
ing the growth rate of each ﬁrm’s R&D spending (real value), gR, we deﬁne the initial value of





where oR is the obsolescence rate of R&D stock derived from White Paper of Science and Tech-
nology (Science and Technology Agency (1986)), as do Goto and Suzuki (1989). Then, the R&D
stock for year t, RSt, is calculated as
RSt =( 1− oR)RSt−1 + Rt.
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12Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Main Variables
variable name # obs. mean s.d. max min
# U.S. Patents during 1987-97 330 42.30 32.93 188.00 4.00
# citations received up to 1998
for patents of a ﬁrm in a year 330 99.26 106.95 540.00 0.00
during 1987-97
R&D ﬂow during 1987-97 330 17265.77 12929.01 74559.69 2869.96
(in 1995 mill. yen)
R&D stock during 1987-97 330 132828.00 97280.75 501897.47 17273.80
(in 1995 mill. yen)
3-year average of
# university co-authorship 330 10.58 9.61 50.00 0.00
during 1987-97Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Patent Quality Variables for 1987-93
variable name # obs. mean s.d. max min
average 210 3.82 1.96 13.40 0.66
40% percentile point 210 1.74 1.20 6.00 0.00
50% percentile point (median) 210 2.41 1.45 6.50 0.00
60% percentile point 210 3.28 1.81 11.50 0.00
70% percentile point 210 4.40 2.29 17.00 0.00
80% percentile point 210 6.08 3.24 28.50 1.00
90% percentile point 210 9.45 5.16 40.00 2.00Table 3: Impacts of University-Industry Collaboration on Patent Counts
eq. No. (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Sample 1987-97 1988-97 1987-97 1988-97
# obs. 330 300 330 300
log R&D ﬂow 0.655 0.703
***(0.196) ***(0.206)
log R&D stock 0.547 0.842
**(0.265) ***(0.290)
UIC 0.328 0.251 0.315 0.197
***(0.116) **(0.117) **(0.117) *(0.117)
Adjusted R2 0.787 0.779 0.785 0.780
UIC measure’s
One-year lag NY N Y
Dependent variable is log of patent counts.
Estimation method is instrumental variable estimation. All estimation equations include unreported year and ﬁrm dummies.
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. ***: signiﬁcant at 1%, **: at 5%, *: at 10%.Table 4: Impacts of University-Industry Collaboration on Citation Weighted Patents
eq. No. (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Sample 1987-97 1988-97 1987-97 1988-97
# obs. 330 300 330 300
log R&D ﬂow 0.625 0.581
**(0.278) *(0.322)
log R&D stock 0.705 0.564
*(0.372) (0.452)
UIC 0.201 0.048 0.180 0.012
(0.164) (0.174) (0.165) (0.175)
Adjusted R2 0.898 0.897 0.899 0.899
UIC measure’s
One-year lag NY N Y
Dependent variable is log of # total citations recieved up to 1998. Figures are added one before taking log.
Estimation method is instrumental variable estimation. All estimation equations include unreported year and ﬁrm dummies.
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. ***: signiﬁcant at 1%, **: at 5%, *: at 10%.Table 5: Impacts of University-Industry Collaboration on Citation Weighted Patents: Sample up to 1993
eq. No. (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Sample 1987-93 1988-93 1987-93 1988-93
# obs. 210 180 210 180
log R&D ﬂow 1.816 2.238
***(0.487) ***(0.661)
log R&D stock 1.426 1.601
***(0.528) **(0.708)
UIC 0.281 0.152 0.323 -0.061
(0.214) (0.261) (0.208) (0.255)
Adjusted R2 0.784 0.785 0.797 0.800
UIC measure’s
One-year lag NYN Y
Dependent variable is the same as in Table 4.
Estimation method is instrumental variable estimation. All estimation equations include unreported year and ﬁrm dummies.
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. ***: signiﬁcant at 1%, **: at 5%, *: at 10%.Table 6: Impacts of University-Industry Collaboration on the Patent Quality Distribution
40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
log(R&D) 0.553 0.478 1.361 1.087 0.909 0.884
a. UIC’s one-year lag = N, (0.364) (0.333) ***(0.335) ***(0.360) ***(0.326) **(0.395)
R&D = ﬂow
(1987-93) UIC 0.345 0.302 0.102 0.017 0.168 0.055
**(0.160) **(0.146) (0.147) (0.145) (0.143) (0.174)
log(R&D) 0.794 0.714 1.994 2.092 1.560 1.259
b. UIC’s one-year lag = Y, (0.502) (0.465) ***(0.475) ***(0.471) ***(0.460) ***(0.557)
R&D = ﬂow
(1988-93) UIC 0.366 0.380 0.124 -0.071 -0.054 -0.245
*(0.198) **(0.183) (0.187) (0.186) (0.181) (0.220)
log(R&D) 0.289 0.174 1.164 0.947 0.741 0.787
c. UIC’s one-year lag = N, (0.409) (0.372) ***(0.349) ***(0.354) **(0.350) *(0.428)
R&D = stock
(1987-93) UIC 0.363 0.320 0.129 0.038 0.187 0.072
**(0.161) **(0.146) (0.137) (0.139) (0.138) (0.168)
log(R&D) 0.235 0.033 1.773 1.877 1.539 1.606
d. UIC’s one-year lag = Y, (0.555) (0.510) ***(0.472) ***(0.475) ***(0.478) ***(0.601)
R&D = stock
(1988-93) UIC 0.308 0.327 -0.051 -0.256 -0.207 -0.386
(0.200) *(0.184) (0.170) (0.171) (0.172) *(0.217)
Dependent variables are log values of percentile points indicated on the top row of each column. Figures are added one before taking log.
Estimation method is instrumental variable estimation. All estimation equations include unreported year and ﬁrm dummies.
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#co-authorship with univ.Figure 3. Estimated Effects of UIC on the Distribution of Patent Quality   
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 Figure 3. Estimated Effects of UIC on the Distribution of Patent Quality 
(continued) 
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In all four panels, the level of R&D variable is hold to 1987-93 mean for the two lines. 